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Abstract
Workers in problem solving teams- these are short term teams that are set
up to generate ideas for improving a production process or a product- are often
rewarded through group incentive pay. This is even though group incentives
give workers an incentive to free ride. In our paper, we show how problem
solving creates implicit incentives to reduce free riding, which in turn lowers
the cost of using group incentive pay. In fact, when an employer has initial
bargaining power and implicit incentives are strong, group incentive pay yields
higher profits than monitoring workers, even when monitoring is costless.
1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, group incentive pay has become common in the work-
place. In a survey of Fortune 1000 firms, Lawler and Mohrman (2003) find that the
percentage of firms that use some form of team incentives increased from 21 per
cent in 1990 to 50 per cent in 2002.1 One setting where this form of incentive pay
is regularly used is in problem solving teams: these are teams that are set up for
short periods to generate ideas to improve a production process or a product. For
example, steel minimills that use teams to improve the production process, almost
always tie the pay of their workers to production, product quality or profit of a line
(Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007)).2 As another example, pay in product de-
velopment teams typically depends on completion of the project on time and within
budget (Zingheim and Schuster (2000)). This widespread use of group incentive pay
is hard to reconcile with theories of free riding (Alchien and Demsetz (1972) and
Holmstrom (1982b)). Indeed, when a worker is rewarded with a share of the output
∗College of Business and Economics, Australian National University.
kieron.meagher@anu.edu.au
†School of Economics, University of Sydney. suraj.prasad@sydney.edu.au
1According to their definition, at least 20 per cent of the employees in the firm are covered by
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2As Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007) point out, problem solving teams without group
incentive pay exist in only 1.5 percent of all monthly observations in their sample.
1
of a team, he gets only a fraction of his marginal product of effort whereas he bears
the entire marginal cost. So he has little incentive to work hard.
The purpose of our paper is to explain why group incentive pay is frequently
used in problem solving teams. Our key point is that idea generation in problem
solving teams is a source of implicit incentives; when a worker can take an idea to
a different firm in the future and when firms try to infer the value of these ideas,
there is a link between wages tomorrow and productive actions today. Because
workers in a team generate ideas together, these implicit incentives also reduce free
riding and thus lower the cost of group incentive pay. In fact, we show that when
employers have initial bargaining power and when implicit incentives are strong,
group incentive pay yields higher profits for a firm when compared to monitoring
workers, even when monitoring is costless. This last point, stands in sharp contrast
to existing theories which emphasize the benefits of monitoring workers in teams
(Alchien and Demsetz (1972)). The reason for this result, loosely, is that firms with
initial bargaining power have an incentive to overwork their employees in earlier
periods, to try to extract rents that workers earn from their ideas in the future.
Group incentive pay, with a natural budget balance constraint on incentives, helps
a firm to commit not to overwork its employees.
We build on a simple and well-known model of implicit incentives: the career
concerns framework of Holmstrom (1982a). In our setting, a worker can influence
output in two ways. First, he can generate ideas to solve problems. These ideas
increase output today with the current employer. But they can also be used in the
future at a different firm. So ideas play a similar role as ability in the traditional
career concerns framework: an idea is a productive and time- invariant attribute of a
worker, whose value all firms are trying to infer. Second, the worker can take costly
actions (effort) to execute his ideas and increase output in the current period. These
features give rise to implicit incentives in the form of career concerns: a worker has
an incentive to work hard to make his ideas appear more valuable to a labor market.
Implicit incentives arise when a worker generates ideas to solve problems. But
these implicit incentives alone are not enough to reduce free riding. In fact, when
each worker on a team solves a different problem, free riding is once again an issue.
This is because the value of an idea generated by a worker on one problem adds noise
to the inference of the value of an idea on another. Instead, what does matter for
reducing free riding is that workers on a team solve problems together. This reduces
the noise in the inference process and because each worker in the team can take the
same idea to a different firm in the future, workers can extract the full marginal
benefit from an idea. We show that as problem solving becomes more important
in production and as problems become more complex (i.e. as the proportion of
problems solved together and the variance of the value of these problems increases),
these implicit incentives become stronger, and in the limit free riding disappears so
that effort is at its efficient level.
An alternative way to understand how implicit incentives reduce free riding in our
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framework is to consider a solution proposed by Holmstrom (1982b). His solution
involves giving each worker in the team the entire share of the output produced by
the team. As a result, the marginal benefit to a worker from an additional unit of
effort equals the marginal product. This restores efficiency but violates a budget
constraint: output is produced only once but it has to be paid to each worker.
To make this scheme feasible, workers in the team have to post bonds up front.
In our framework with career concerns, a worker’s wage also depends on a share of
output. But in contrast to Holmstrom (1982b), these implicit shares are determined
by inferences made by a labor market. When all problems are solved together and
when problem solving is very valuable in production in the limit, then these shares
in our framework tend to a hundred per cent. So a worker’s marginal benefit from
altering inferences with an additional unit of effort equals the marginal product of
effort, restoring efficiency. Our solution, however, does not require workers in a
team to post bonds up front. Wages instead are financed by competing firms in a
labor market that value a worker’s ideas.
Given, implicit incentives, the role of an explicit scheme is to provide residual
incentives so that effort reaches an efficient target level. The first type of explicit
scheme that we consider is group incentive pay, where a team is rewarded based
on its total output subject to a budget balance restriction where total payments
to team members cannot exceed total output. We show that as implicit incentives
become stronger (i.e. as problem solving becomes more important in production
and as problems become more complex), the efficiency loss because of free riding
gets smaller. Thus, we show that free riding costs associated with group incentive
pay are lower in problem solving teams. This is our first main result and helps
explain why group incentive pay is commonly used in problem solving teams.
We also compare group incentive pay with another explicit scheme where firms
can monitor workers and observe their individual effort. In a static setting, without
implicit incentives, monitoring workers clearly dominates group incentive pay in
terms of generating a larger surplus. A firm that monitors effort can get workers
to choose the efficient level of effort whereas free riding is a problem with group
incentive pay. This role of monitoring in reducing free riding is the central point in
Alchien and Demsetz (1972).
But in a dynamic setting with implicit incentives, things change. In particular,
when an employer has initial bargaining power, his marginal benefit from inducing
an additional unit of effort includes an increase in output today and higher wages
paid by firms that use an employee’s ideas in the future. So an employer will
always have an incentive to induce too much effort initially to try to extract rents
that its workers earn from their ideas in the future. Indeed, when firms monitor
workers, effort always overshoots the efficient target level. Group incentive pay,
on the other hand, because of a natural budget balance constraint, helps a firm to
commit to not overworking its employees in earlier periods. When implicit incentives
are strong (i.e when problem solving is valuable in production and when problems are
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complex), residual incentives are small, and group incentive pay yields higher profits
for an employer relative to monitoring workers. Highlighting this endogenous cost
of monitoring is the second main result of our paper. This result stands in sharp
contrast to work that emphasizes the benefits of monitoring teams (Alchien and
Demsetz (1972)).
While our focus is on teams that interact for short periods, there are complemen-
tary papers in the literature which explain the use of group incentive pay in teams
that interact for long periods. In Kandel and Lazear (1992), profit sharing (a form
of group incentive pay) creates externalities across team members and thus provides
incentives for workers to monitor one another. To make this point, they modify
an individual’s effort cost function (as a proxy for repeated interaction possibly)
to include peer punishments. Che and Yoo (2001) consider a repeated setting and
show how joint performance evaluation, where workers are rewarded for good perfor-
mance only when their co-workers also perform well, provides incentives for workers
to punish their peers and thus lowers the cost of providing incentives. Finally, Rayo
(2007) also considers a repeated framework with peer monitoring and endogenous
partnership shares. Like in our paper, implicit incentives in all of these papers play
an important role in lowering the cost of group incentive pay. But the way in which
these implicit incentives arise, however, is different because of the duration of the
team.
Our paper is also related to a large literature on career concerns starting with
Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1982a). The two closest papers are Gibbons and
Murphy (1992) and Meyer and Vickers (1997). Both consider explicit incentives in a
career concerns setting. There are two key differences though. First, in their papers
the output that an individual worker produces, is observable to firms. Second, there
is no over-provision of effort in their setting. Our paper is also related to other
work that considers career concerns in teams. There are three key features together
that distinguish our analysis: i) only team output is observable to firms, ii) the
productive attribute (ideas, in our setting) is similar across team members, and iii)
we consider both implicit and explicit incentives. Meyer (1994), Jeon (1996) and
Ortega (2003) have only the first feature where only team output can be observed
by a firm. Auriol, Friebel, and Pechlivanos (2002) study explicit incentives but they
do not have the first two features. Finally, Andersson (2002) considers a two-period
setting with turnover and where contracts are unobservable and also shows that
workers over-provide effort in equilibrium.
When employers have initial bargaining power, both current and future benefits
accrue to the employer in the current period. This is why monitoring is inefficient
in our setting; firms will induce inefficiently high levels of effort in earlier periods.
There are other reasons in the literature that emphasize costs of monitoring. Bonatti
and Horner (2011) consider a team setting where benefits are public but costs are
private and where there is uncertainty about the feasibility of a project. They show
that when efforts are observable, team members tend to (inefficiently) procrastinate
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more. The reason is that when low levels of effort by a member are detected, the
team is less pessimistic about the feasibility of a project. This role of monitoring in
influencing beliefs is also important in Bag and Pepito (2011).
While our focus is on incentives that arise from problem solving, there is a
large team theoretic literature which looks at decision making when people have
different information (VanZandt, Garicano (2000), Cremer (1993), Prat (2002)).
These papers, however, do not focus on incentive issues. Our work is also related
to other theories of knowledge transfer both within and across firms: theories of
routines (Nelson and Winter (1982)), standard operational procedures (Cyert and
March (1963)), and resources and organizational capabilities (Penrose (1959)). A
similarity with this work is that knowledge of an idea is tacit and cannot be codified.
Li (2012) considers incentives for workers to share knowledge in a team. Our paper is
also related to work by Akerlof and Kranton (2008) on identity and its motivational
effects. However, our paper provides a rationale for why individuals care about their
group without having to change preferences of the agent.
2 Examples of Problem Solving Teams
In this section, we give a few examples of problem solving teams. These examples
provide details in terms of the ideas teams generate and how they generate them. In
particular, all of these examples emphasize the benefits from having a team generate
ideas together.
1. New Product Development
In 2004, Motorola put together a team to create the thinnest phone on the
mobile phone market, the RAZR (Anthony (2005), Edmondson (2012)). The
team consisted of 20 engineers in different fields such as electrical and mechani-
cal engineering. The key tradeoff that the team faced was between appearance
and functionality. For example, the team had to find ways in which to place the
battery, antenna and camera without compromising the sleek design. These
problems were solved together by the entire team. The team would meet at
4 pm every day to discuss solutions and these meetings usually ran for three
hours or so. The following quote by the team leader, Roger Jellicoe, summa-
rizes the role that discussions played in solving both design and functionality
problems. “When the novel ideas were put together the risks seemed manage-
able. This illustrates....the fact that innovation can sometimes move forward
only when ideas are evaluated in combination rather than isolation.” Two
aspects of this example are important. First, it highlights the benefit from
having a team with different specialists generate ideas together. Second, it
emphasizes the role of discussion in generating ideas so that each member of
a team knows ideas.
2. Reducing Glitches
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There are several examples of problem solving teams that are formed to re-
duce glitches: these are defects in a product which arise when a specialist in
one functional area does not understand constraints faced by a specialist in
another functional area. For example, Boeing formed integrative teams - these
are teams that are set up to ensure better coordination across various func-
tional areas- to reduce glitches on its 777 passenger jet by about fifty percent
(Dumain 1994).3 Hoopes and Postrel (1999) have several examples of costly
glitches that arise when ideas are not coordinated across different functional
areas. Here are some examples. The research department of an aircraft com-
pany can recommend that a fighter jet be built with a novel material, but when
the prototype is being constructed, it is noticed that every known technique
for mounting the engine causes the structure to crack. Similarly, a marketing
department can propose a new lightweight vacuum cleaner but designers who
are interested in more a more powerful cleaner design a product which is much
heavier and more costly to produce.
3. Improving the Production Process
Recent empirical work by Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007) focusses on
problem solving in steel minimills. Minimills use electric arc furnaces to melt
scrap steel to form raw steel bars which are then rolled into a final product.
Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007) provide a variety of examples of problem
solving: inserting a new gauge on the line to improve quality control, tackling
defects by reconfiguring the layout of the line and learning to operate new
capital better. Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007) also find that if a mill
has formal procedures for teamwork then productivity increases. These pro-
ductivity gains are larger in more “complex” production lines which produce
more intricate shapes of steel and with tight tolerances for deviations from
product specifications.
3 Model
There are two periods and no discounting. There are N different areas in production
indexed by i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N . In terms of the new product development example, the
different areas could be design, marketing and manufacturing. Associated with each
area is a large pool of workers, each with a reservation utility normalized to 0. There
is a firm who we also refer to as the principal, P . P can produce in both period 1
and in period 2. There are also competing firms that can only produce in period 2.
All firms, P and competing firms, have a reservation profit level of 0 in each period.
Everyone in the model is risk neutral.
To produce in period 1, P must hire a team of N workers, with each worker
corresponding to a different area. At the start of period 1, P makes a take it or
3“The trouble with teams.” by Brian Dumain, Fortune 1994.
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Figure 1: Set of Problems.
leave it wage contract to one worker from each area. Let wi1 be the wage of a worker
in period 1 in area i. These contracts are enforceable for one period only.
If all the N wage offers are accepted, the team solves a set of problems repre-
sented by Figure 1. Problems are equally divided across each of the N different
areas. A proportion of the problems φ > 0 in each area are solved together by
the team. In this case, each worker in the team knows the idea. The remaining
proportion (1 − φ) of problems in an area are solved individually by a worker in
that area. In this case, only the worker who solved the problem knows the idea.
Ideas i) can be used for both current and future production, ii) have uncertain value
(all economic agent’s in the model do not know the value of an idea but they know
the distribution of the value), iii) can only be transferred from one firm to another
when a worker who knows an idea moves. For a problem solved by a team, the
value of the idea is λV where V is distributed normally with mean E(V) > 0 and
variance σ2V > 0 and where λ > 0 is a parameter that measures the degree to which
these ideas are valuable in production. For a problem that is solved individually,
the value of the idea is λvi, where vi is normally distributed with a mean normalized
to 0 and a variance σ2v > 0. Information about the distributions of these values is
symmetric across all workers and firms in the model. We refer to a worker i who
solves problems in area i as a problem solver i. In other words, each worker who is
hired at the start of period 1 by firm P , becomes a problem solver at the end of this
period.
After problems are solved, production begins in period 1. Each problem solver
i exerts privately observable effort ei1 to execute ideas. This effort is costly for the
problem solver and his cost function is given by
1
2
e2i1. Problem solver i
′s utility in
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period 1 from working for P is then wi1 −
1
2
e2i1. Output y1 in firm P is given by
y1 = f(e11, e21, .., eN1) + λ(φV +
(1− φ)
N
(v1 + v2..+ vN )) + 1 (1)
Equation (1) has three parts. As in Holmstrom (1982b), output depends on
effort of problem solvers and this part is given by f(e11, e21, .., eN1) where f is
strictly increasing, concave and differentiable with f(0) = 0. The second part in
(1), shows how ideas contribute to output. The total value of ideas is the sum of the
values of ideas generated individually, λ
(1− φ)
N
(v1+v2..+vN ), and the values of the
ideas generated together, λφV. Because the value of an idea is uncertain, it plays
exactly the same role as a time invariant productive attribute (talent or ability) in
the career concerns framework of Holmstrom (1982a). Finally there is a noise term
in (1), given by 1 which is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ
2
 > 0.
Next, consider period 2. As in period 1, a firm that wants to produce, must hire
a team of N workers, with each worker corresponding to a different area. But it
must also have at least one problem solver on the team. To keep the model tractable,
we assume that a firm can make offers to at most one problem solver with firm P
only making an offer to problem solver 1. We relax this assumption later in our
robustness section. So for example, consider a firm that successfully hires problem
solver 2. To produce, this firm also has to hire a worker in area 1, a worker in area
2, a worker in area 4, and so on all the way up to area N . From this point on we
use the superscript i to denote the area of a problem solver and the subscript j to
denote the area of a worker. When i = j, the worker is a problem solver. Let wij2
denote wages in period 2.
If a firm hires a team with a problem solver i, each worker on the team, exerts
privately observable effort given by eij2 to execute problem solver i
′s ideas. To
simplify notation, we sometimes drop the superscript when we refer to a problem
solver’s effort in period 2 and denote eii2 = ei2. A problem solver’s utility in period 2
is thus given by wii2−
1
2
e2i2 and for workers who are not problem solvers their utility
is given by wij2 −
1
2
ei
2
j2 where j 6= i.
Output in period 2, for a firm that hires problem solver i is then given by
y2 = f(e
i
12, e
i
22, .., e
i
N2) + λ(φV +
(1− φ)
N
vi) + 2 (2)
The noise term, 2, is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ
2
 > 0
and is independent of 1.
Given that problem solvers can take their ideas to a competing firm, it is useful
to define a new variable Vi = λφV+
λ(1− φ)
N
vi. Vi is the value of ideas that problem
solver i can transfer to a competing firm.
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We can then rewrite output in period 2, for a firm that hires problem solver i as
y2 = f(e
i
12, e
i
22, .., e
i
N2) + Vi + 2 (3)
The timing and information of the game is as follows. At the start of period
1, P offers a take it or leave it contract with a wage wi1 to one worker from each
area. Initially, in our model with implicit incentives, we assume that these wages are
fixed. Later on when we consider explicit incentives, we allow for contingent wages.
We also assume that firms can only commit to short term contracts for one period.
Each worker decides whether to participate or not. If P cannot successfully hire a
team, no production takes place and all agents in the model get their reservation
utility for both periods. If P does successfully hire a team, problems are solved
and ideas generated. Problem solver i then chooses his effort level ei1, which he
alone observes. Output y1 is then produced and everyone including competing firms
observe it. In period 2, firms compete for problem solvers by offering wages wii2.
We also assume that each firm can make offers to at most one problem solver, with
P making an offer only to problem solver 1. A firm that makes an offer to problem
solver i also makes take it or leave it offers to other workers in areas besides the
area of problem solver i (there is no competition amongst firms for workers who are
not problem solvers). Each problem solver i then chooses which firm to work for,
and workers who are not problem solvers also decide whether to accept offers. A
firm that cannot successfully hire a team gets its reservation profit of 0. On the
other hand, if a firm successfully hires a team with a problem solver, all workers
(including the problem solver) exert privately observable effort. Output for period
2, y2 is then realized and then the game ends.
Given the production functions in both periods, there are three important pa-
rameters to keep track of when performing comparative statics. The first parameter,
λ is the degree to which problem solving is important in production. The other two
parameters measure the degree of complexity in problem solving. When φ is larger,
problem solving is more complex because a larger proportion of problems have to
be solved by workers in different areas. When σ2V > 0 is larger, the values of ideas
solved together vary a lot, once again indicating that problems are more complex.
4 Efficiency
We start our analysis by characterizing efficient levels of effort. A useful benchmark
is to think of a social planner who maximizes total expected surplus at the start of
period 1. The planner then chooses effort in both periods to maximize
W = WP1 +
∑
i
E(W i2(y1))
where
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WP1 = f(e11, e21, .., eN1)−
∑
i
1
2
e2i1 + λφE(V)
and
W i2(y1) = f(e
i
11, e
i
22, .., e
i
N2)−
∑
j
1
2
ei2j2 + E(Vi|y1)
The first order necessary conditions to this problem are
fei1(e11, e21, .., eN1) = ei1 for all i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (4)
and
feij2
(ei12, e
i
22, .., e
i
N2) = e
i
j2 for all i, j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (5)
These conditions equate the marginal product of effort with the marginal cost.
5 Equilibrium- Implicit Incentives
The objective in this section is to compare equilibrium effort levels with the efficient
effort levels above. The equilibrium concept we use is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
and we restrict our attention to pure strategies. To solve for the equilibrium, let us
start at the last stage of period 2 where workers make effort choices. Because wages
in period 2 are paid before effort is chosen, no effort is exerted in period 2.
Next, consider wage offers made to problem solver i at the start of period 2. Be-
cause no effort is exerted in period 2 and because E(2|y1) = 0, perfect competition
ensures that in equilibrium
wii2 = E(Vi|y1) for all i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (6)
All other workers in period 2 who are not problem solvers get a wage of 0 so that
their utility equals the reservation level of 0. Next, consider the updating rule for
the posterior mean of Vi. Let ( −e11, −e21, .., −eN1) be the levels of period 1 effort that
firms conjecture. Given these conjectures of firms, a firm then uses the signal z to
update its beliefs about Vi where
z = y1 − f( −e11, −e21, .., −eN1) = Vi +
λ(1− φ)
N
∑
−i
v−i + 1 (7)
The signal z has two parts. The first part is the value of problem solver i′s
ideas given by, Vi which other firms are trying to infer before making wage offers in
(6). The second term given by
λ(1− φ)
N
∑
−i v−i + 1 is the noise component of the
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signal. Given all the random variables are normally distributed, the updating rule
then is simply a weighted average of the signal z and the prior mean of Vi, where
the weight depends on how much of the variation in z is driven by Vi as opposed to
the noise term.
Thus
wii2 = E(Vi|y1) = Sz + (1− S)E(Vi) (8)
where
S =
σ2Vi
σ2Vi + σ
2
noise
where
σ2Vi =
N2λ2φ2σ2V + λ
2(1− φ)2σ2v
N2
and where
σ2noise =
λ2(1− φ)2(N − 1)σ2v +N2σ2
N2
.
There are two aspects to the equilibrium wage in (8). First, wages reflect the
(updated) value of ideas that problem solver i can transfer to a competing firm.
Second, this inference about the value of ideas made by firms along with perfect
competition creates implicit incentives for problem solver i to exert effort in period
1. To see this, substitute z = y1 − f( −e11, −e21, .., −eN1) in (8). Problem solver i′s
wage then, as in the teams framework of Holmstrom (1982b), depends on a share
of output, S. But in contrast to Holmstrom’s analysis, this implicit share, S, is
determined endogenously by inferences about problem solver i′s ideas made by firms.
In the proposition below, we state conditions under which this implicit share
gets arbitrarily close to 1, which in turn leads to efficient effort levels in period 1.
The proofs of all of the lemmas and propositions are in the appendix.
Proposition 1 Suppose any of the following conditions hold.
1. φ = 1 and λ tends to infinity.
2. σ2v and σ
2
 tend to zero.
3. σ2V tends to infinity.
Then in the limit S tends to 1 and effort levels in equilibrium in period 1 are efficient.
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The first condition in Proposition 1 clearly illustrates the channel through which
problem solving teams reduce free riding. Because φ = 1, all problems are solved
together. This clearly reduces σ2noise, which now consists only of the variance of the
noise of the error term 1: this is because inferences about the value of ideas are not
being divided across different problem solvers. Also, because λ gets arbitrarily large,
the signal z becomes very informative about the value of ideas. Finally, because
each problem solver i can take his ideas (including those generated together) to a
different firm, he can earn the wage in (6). Taken together, these features completely
eliminate the free riding problem in the limit. The first condition in Proposition 1
also bears a close resemblance to the bond-posting scheme in Holmstrom (1982b).
In his scheme each member gets the entire team output ex-post, and because this
breaks the budget (output is produced once but has to be paid N times), team
members have to post bonds ex-ante to finance it. In our framework, each team
member gets the updated value of his ideas in equilibrium. But in contrast to
Holmstrom (1982b), the budget is financed not by members posting bonds but
instead by competing firms in the labor market.
In the next proposition we look at how the implicit share S varies as we change
the parameters, λ, σ2V , and φ.
Proposition 2 The implicit share S is
1. strictly increasing in λ.
2. strictly increasing in σ2V .
3. strictly increasing in φ if and only if φ >
−
φ where
−
φ is implicitly determined
by
1
−
φσ2V
=
λ2(N − 1)
σ2
+
N2
(1−
−
φ)σ2v
.
Proposition 2 looks at how the implicit share varies as problem solving becomes
more important in production (as λ increases) and as problems become more com-
plex (as φ increases or as σ2V increases). For the parameters λ and σ
2
V , the relation-
ship is increasing. But for the third parameter φ, the relationship is non-monotone.
The implicit share S initially decreases and then starts to increase as beyond a cer-
tain level of φ. The reason for this non-monotonicity, is that though σ2noise decreases
with φ, the variance of Vi also falls for low levels of φ. It is worth noting that as λ
gets arbitrarily large or as σ2 gets sufficiently close to 0, then
−
φ tends to 0.
Propositions 1 and 2, highlight how implicit incentives reduce free riding in
teams. In the next section, we build on these results, to study the effects of explicit
incentive schemes.
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6 Explicit Incentives
In the previous section, we restricted our attention to implicit incentives to show
how the free riding problem in teams can be resolved when problems are solved
together. In reality, firms rely both on implicit incentives and explicit incentive
contracts to motivate workers. In this section, we add explicit incentive contracts to
our analysis. Given implicit incentives, the role of an explicit scheme is to provide
residual incentives. Our objective is to compare two explicit incentive schemes,
group incentive pay and monitoring, to see how effectively they perform this residual
incentive role.
We also make an additional simplification in this section and assume that the
function f , which maps effort to output, is linear in effort. So from this point on,
we assume that
f(e11, e21, .., eN1) = e11 + e21 + ....+ eN1 (9)
f(ei12, e
i
22, .., e
i
N2) = e
i
12 + e
i
22 + ....+ e
i
N2 (10)
Note that with this specification, the efficient level of effort for a worker in either
period is 1. Thus the maximum value of WP1 is
N
2
+ λφE(V) and the maximum
value of E(W i2(y1)) is
N
2
+λφE(V). Also, effort in period 1 in equilibrium in section
5 equals the implicit share S.
6.1 Group Incentive Contracts
In this subsection, we allow firms to offer group incentive contracts which are contin-
gent on the output of the team. We make three assumptions about these contracts.
First, we assume that contracts are linear. That is in period 1, contracts take the
form wi1 = αi1 + βi1y1, where αi1 is a fixed transfer and where βi1 is an output
share in period 1. In period 2, contracts are given by wij2 = α
i
j2 + β
i
j2y2, where
the superscript i denotes the problem solver that a firm intends to produce with.
Second, because we want to explicitly model free riding costs associated with group
incentive pay, we impose a budget balance condition, where the sum of output shares
to all workers in a team must not exceed 1. Third, we assume that contracts are
enforceable for a single period only.
To solve the equilibrium when group incentive schemes are offered, let us start
with period 2 and consider a problem solver i. In equilibrium, all firms in period 2,
taking period 1 effort levels as given, update using Baye’s rule. Thus
E(Vi|y1) = Sz + (1− S)E(Vi) (11)
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Given these beliefs, firms compete for problem solver i in period 2, by making the
surplus from hiring i, W i2(y1), as large as possible (subject to incentive compatibility
conditions for all workers on the team and subject to the budget balance condition)
and by transferring the entire surplus to problem solver i, subject to all other workers
participating. The following Lemma characterizes the optimal output shares, effort,
and transfers in period 2 in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the following conditions must hold for all i, j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N .
i βij2 =
1
N
.
ii eij2 =
1
N
.
iii αii2 =
2N − 1
2N
+
1
2N2
− 1
N
+ (1− 1
N
)(Sz + (1− S)E(Vi)).
iv αij2 =
1
2N2
− 1
N
− 1
N
(Sz + (1− S)E(Vi)) for j 6= i.
Because there are no implicit incentives in period 2, firms would like to ideally
offer contracts with βij2 = 1 to make the surplus as large as possible. But they run
into the budget balance constraint and thus are forced to set βij2 =
1
N
. Also, because,
workers only get a fraction
1
N
of the marginal product, they choose inefficiently low
levels of effort. This is what the first two conditions in Lemma 1 say. The third part
of Lemma 1, says that problem solver i, because of competition in the labor market,
gets all of the surplus in period 2 and the last part of Lemma 1, gives conditions
under which workers who are not problem solvers get their reservation utility of 0
so that they are willing to participate.
Now consider period 1. P ′s problem is to maximize his expected profit in period
1, given by
∑
i
ei1+λφE(V)−
∑
i
(αi1+βi1E(y1))+
∑
j
e1j2+E(V1)−E(α112)−β112E(y2)−
∑
j 6=1
E(α1j2)−
∑
j 6=1
β1j2E(y2)
subject to the following individual rationality constraints
αi1 +βi1E(y1)−
1
2
e2i1 +E(α
i
i2) +β
i
i2E(y2)−
1
2
e2i2 ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (12)
subject to incentive compatibility conditions, which from condition (iii) of Lemma
1, are given by
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ei1 = βi1 + (1−
1
N
)S for all i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (13)
subject to the budget balance condition∑
i
βi1 ≤ 1 (14)
and subject to conditions (i)-(iv) in Lemma 1. Substituting (12) (which must
bind at the optimum,4) and conditions (i) and (ii) from Lemma 1, we can rewrite
expected profit as
WP1 +
(2N − 1)
2N
+ E(V1) +
∑
i 6=1
E(αii2)−
∑
j 6=1
E(α1j2)
The expression above has a simple interpretation. The principal’s expected profit
consists of the expected surplus in the first period WP1 , the second period surplus
that he can extract from problem solver 1, given by
(2N − 1)
2N
+ E(V1), and finally
the expected fixed transfers that he can extract from problem solvers that move to
different firms in period 2 and the fixed transfers that he has to pay to all other
workers who work along with problem solver 1 in period 2.
Next, substituting, conditions (iii) and (iv) from Lemma 1, and using the fact
that E(vi) = 0, we can rewrite the expected profit as
WP1 +
N(2N − 1)
2N
+ λφE(V) + (N − 1)E(Sz + (1− S)λφE(V)) (15)
Substituting (13) into (15) and taking first order conditions with respect to βi1
gives us
1 + (N − 1)S − βi1 = µ for all i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (16)
where µ is the non-negative multiplier associated with the budget balance con-
straint. Equation (16) clearly highlights the marginal benefit to P from inducing
more effort. First, inducing an additional unit of effort increases the current surplus
WP1 by one unit. But given that competing firms offer wages that are contingent on
y1, P also benefits from trying to alter inferences of competing firms that hire prob-
lem solvers in the future, which is given by (N − 1)S. Thus firms have a tendency
to induce too much effort relative to the efficient level. However, at the optimum,
the budget balance constraint always binds and so we have
βi1 =
1
N
for all i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (17)
4Otherwise the transfer to problem solver i in period 1 can always be reduced by a small amount
without altering any of the constraints of the problem.
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and
ei1 =
1
N
+ (1− 1
N
)S for all i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (18)
Thus group incentive pay, with its natural constraint on incentives, turns out
to be beneficial to P . In particular, it allows P to commit not to try and extract
future rents from ideas that his employees earn in the future.
Finally, because conjectures about effort in period 1 are correct, we can write
P ′s expected profit in equilibrium as
N(
1
N
+ (1− 1
N
)S − 1
2
(
1
N
+ (1− 1
N
)S)2) + λφE(V)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Surplus from period 1
+ N(
2N − 1
2N
+ λφE(V))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Surplus from period 2
(19)
Notice there are two parts to (19). The first part is the expected surplus in
period 1. And the second part is the expected surplus from period 2. Because P
has all of the bargaining power in period 1, an alternative way to think about profits
of P is to compute losses in expected surplus that arise in equilibrium relative to
the efficient benchmark in Section 4.
Define a new variable Lgt which is the efficiency loss per team in period t when
firms use group incentive pay. Thus
Lg1 =
N
2
−N( 1
N
+ (1− 1
N
)S − 1
2
(
1
N
+ (1− 1
N
)S)2) (20)
and
Lg2 =
N
2
− (2N − 1)
2N
(21)
and let the total efficiency loss associated with group incentive pay be given by
Lg = Lg1 + NL
g
2. The following proposition compares these efficiency losses and
examines how they vary with implicit incentives.
Proposition 3 Consider a setting where firms can offer group incentive contracts.
Then Lg1 is strictly decreasing in S. In the limit as S tends to 1, L
g
1 tends to 0.
Proposition 3 is the main result of our paper. It says that as implicit incentives
get stronger (these incentives only arise in period 1 in our two period model), effi-
ciency losses associated with group incentive pay reduce (equivalently, profits of P
increase). And in fact, in the limit as implicit incentives get very strong (i.e. any of
the conditions in Proposition 1 hold), the free riding problem associated with group
incentive pay completely disappears. Proposition 3 thus provides an explanation for
why group incentive pay is frequently used in problem solving teams. When worker
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in a team generate ideas together, free riding is far less of an issue and this lowers
the cost of using group incentive pay.
There are two parts to Proposition 3. The first part is straightforward. As
implicit incentives become stronger, residual incentives fall. Thus the “distance”
required to get to the efficient target level falls and group incentive pay, in spite of
its low powered incentives, gets sufficiently close to this efficient target. The second
part, which Proposition 3 does not highlight as clearly, is that group incentive pay
prevents P from inducing inefficiently high levels of effort. This is because group
incentive pay has a natural budget balance condition which places an upper bound
on the level of effort that P can induce. To make this second part clearer, we
compare group incentive pay to a setting where firms can monitor workers.
6.2 Comparing Monitoring with Group Incentive Pay
In the previous subsection, we showed how implicit incentives reduce the free riding
cost associated with group incentive pay. In this subsection, we allow firms to
monitor workers. In a static setting, as Alchien and Demsetz (1972) point out,
monitoring has a clear advantage over group incentive pay. Indeed, with monitoring
firms can induce the efficient level of effort and maximize surplus. However, we show
that in dynamic settings where implicit incentives are important this advantage can
disappear.
As in the previous subsection, we start solving for the equilibrium in period 2.
Consider a problem solver i where i 6= 1. In this case, given beliefs in (11), firms
compete with each other for problem solver i in period 2, by making the surplus
from hiring problem solver i, W i2(y1), as large as possible and by transferring the
entire surplus to problem solver i (subject to other workers participating). The key
difference from the previous subsection, however, is that in the case of problem solver
1, information about the value of an idea is asymmetric. In particular, because P
observes effort in the first period, he has better information about the value of an
idea in period 2.
Lemma 2 Given conjectures (
−
e11,
−
e21, ..,
−
eN1), the following conditions must hold
for all i, j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N in equilibrium.
i eij2 = 1.
ii wimi2 =
1
2
+
N
2
+ Sz + (1− S)E(Vi).
iii wimj2 =
1
2
for j 6= i.
Lemma 2 says that effort is always at its efficient level in period 2, when firms
can monitor workers. Condition (ii) in the Lemma says that problem solver i gets all
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of the surplus, and condition (iii) ensures that workers who are not problem solvers
are held to their reservation utility of 0.
Now consider period 1. P ′s problem, taking period 2 conjectures as given, is to
maximize his expected profit in period 1, given by∑
i
ei1 + λφE(V)−
∑
i
wmi1 +
∑
j
e1j2 + E(V1)− E(w1m12 )−
∑
j 6=1
w1mj2
subject to individual rationality constraints for each problem solver i given by
wmi1 −
1
2
e2i1 + E(w
im
i2 )−
1
2
e2i2 ≥ 0 (22)
and subject to conditions (i)-(iii) in Lemma 2.
Substituting the participation constraint (which always binds at the optimum)
and condition (i) from Lemma 2, we can rewrite the expected profit as
WP1 +
N
2
+ E(V1) +
∑
i 6=1
E(wimi2 )−
∑
j 6=1
w1mj2
Once again, the expression above has a simple interpretation. The principal’s
expected profit consists of the expected surplus in the first period WP1 , the second
period surplus that he can extract from problem solver 1, given by
N
2
+E(V1), the
expected wage that he can extract from problem solvers that move to different firms
in period 2 given by E(wimi2 ), and finally the wages that he has to pay to all other
workers who work along with problem solver 1 in period 2.
Substituting conditions (ii) and (iii) from Lemma 2, and using the fact that
E(vi) = 0, we can rewrite the expected profit as
WP1 +
N
2
+ λφE(V) + (N − 1)(N
2
+ Sz + (1− S)λφE(V)) (23)
The expected profit in (23) clearly captures P ′s incentives from inducing an
additional unit of effort. With an additional unit of effort, expected surplus in the
first period also increases by a unit. But because, he can extract all of the rents that
problem solvers 2, 3, 4, ...N earn in the future, and because their wage depends on
the performance in the first period, he has an incentive to induce more effort than
the efficient level.
The first order conditions with respect to ei1 give us
ei1 = 1 + (N − 1)S
In equilibrium, where conjectures about effort are correct, the expected profit of
the principal is
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N(1 + (N − 1)S)(1− 1
2
(1 + (N − 1)S)) + λφE(V)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Surplus from period 1
+ N(
N
2
+ λφE(V))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Surplus from period 2
(24)
Finally, we need to check that P has no incentive to deviate and choose a different
effort level given conjectured effort levels of 1 + (N − 1)S. Suppose P chooses a
strictly higher effort level, then he always makes lower wage offers than competing
firms in period 2 and loses the surplus from problem solver 1 in period 2. Suppose
P chooses an effort level that is strictly lower than 1 + (N − 1)S, then he increases
his surplus at the expense of problem solver 1 in period 2, but then in that case he
has to pay exactly the same amount to get the worker to participate in period 1.
Once again, it is convenient to work with efficiency losses in the monitoring case
and compare them with the efficiency losses in the group incentive case. Define a
new variable Lmt which is the efficiency loss per team in period t when firms monitor
workers. Thus
Lm1 =
N
2
−N(1 + (N − 1)S)(1− 1
2
(1 + (N − 1)S)) (25)
and
Lm2 = 0 (26)
Also define Lm = Lm1 +NL
m
2 . Notice that with monitoring, there are no efficiency
losses in period 2, instead all of the losses are in period 1. The following Proposition
compares profits in equilibrium across the group incentive case and the monitoring
case.
Proposition 4 There exists a critical level of the implicit share given by Sg ∈ (0, 1),
above which Lm > Lg.
Proposition 4 says that when firms have initial bargaining power and when
implicit incentives are strong, group incentive pay dominates monitoring in terms of
efficiency (and equivalently in terms of profits for P ). This result, which seems odd
at first, has a simple intuition. Because P has all of the initial bargaining power,
he has an incentive to induce too much effort because he can extract rents that
problem solvers earn from their ideas in the future. Whereas group incentive pay
has a natural constraint on the degree of incentives, monitoring does not. Thus P
in equilibrium will overwork each of the problem solvers inefficiently which in turn
reduces his profits. This is our second main result in the paper.
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7 Discussion of Assumptions
7.1 P can make offers to all problem solvers in period 2
So far, we have assumed that each firm can make wage offers to only one problem
solver. Here we discuss what happens when P can make offers to all problem solvers.
We still assume that competing firms can make offers to one problem solver only.
Consider the setting with implicit incentives first and consider any problem solver i
at the start of period 2. Because no effort is exerted in equilibrium in period 2, the
value of any problem solver i to a competing firm is E(Vi|y1) > 0. For P , however,
the value of one problem solver (say problem solver 1) in the team is E(Vi|y1) > 0
and his value of all of the other problem solvers is E(vi|y1)0. This is because an
idea can only be used once, regardless of how many workers know it.
Now consider two possible cases. First, suppose E(V|y1) > 0. For this case,
there is an equilibrium where each firm offers a wage which equals its value of the
problem solver. In fact, if we assume that firms do not make offers with some small
probability then, this is the only possible equilibrium. In this equilibrium, problem
solver 1 works for P and all other problem solvers work for competing firms, in
period 2. To check that this is an equilibrium, notice that P has no incentive to
deviate and offer a different wage for problem solver 1. A higher wage would increase
his wage bill whereas with a lower wage he still makes an expected profit of 0. P
also dos not have an incentive to increase his wage offer by E(V|y1) for problem
solvers 2, 3, ..., N . This is because he can only use ideas once even though other
problem solvers on the team may know an idea. Similarly, competing firms have no
incentive to deviate and offer a different wage for the problem solver that they are
competing for.
Next, consider the second case where E(V|y1) ≤ 0. For this case there is an
equilibrium where all firms offer a wage of E(Vi|y1) to each problem solver. In
this case there is no turnover and P earns rents on problem solvers 2, 3, ..., N when
the inequality is strict. Once again P does not have an incentive to deviate for
any problem solver. If he offers a lower wage to one or more, but not all, problem
solvers he loses him (them) but it does not change his expected profit. And he does
strictly worse when hoe offers lower wages to all problem solvers. He also has no
incentive to offer a higher wage for any problem solver because it increases his wage
bill. Competing firms, once again which bid their value have no incentive to change
their wage offers.
Regardless of which case occurs, the wage in equilibrium in period 2 for a prob-
lem solver is always E(Vi|y1). So all of our results in Section 5 go through. However,
because with some probability (when E(V|y1) ≤ 0) there is no turnover in equilib-
rium, the inefficiencies associated with monitoring are smaller. However, as the prior
mean of V gets arbitrarily high, in the limit the probability of having no turnover
goes to 0 and all of our results in Section 6 go through.
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7.2 Bargaining Power in Period 1
In our model, we assume that P has all of the bargaining power in period 1, so that
he can extract the total expected surplus both in period 1 and in period 2 from all
problem solvers. We could alter this assumption and assume instead, that wages
are set so that P shares some of this total expected surplus with all of the problem
solvers. This once again does not qualitatively change any of the results in Section
5. All it changes is how the surplus gets divided in period 1 across problem solvers
and P . In the case of Section 6, altering bargaining power once again reduces the
inefficiencies associated with monitoring. However, we can show that when P gets
to keep a sufficiently large share of the total expected surplus in period 1, our results
in Proposition 4 still hold.
7.3 Monitoring and Group Incentive Pay
In our section on explicit contracts, we considered group incentive pay and moni-
toring in isolation. That is we considered a case where all firms can only offer group
incentive contracts and another case where all firms can only monitor workers. We
could relax this assumption by allowing firms to commit to a type of contract at the
start of each period. It turns out in this setting that only monitoring contracts are
accepted by workers in period 2. This is because without implicit incentives, moni-
toring generates a larger surplus than group incentive pay. In period 1, the choice
between monitoring and group incentive pay depends once again on the strength of
implicit incentives. When implicit incentives are sufficiently strong, P will prefer to
commit to a group incentive contract at the start of period 1.
8 Conclusion
We provide an explanation for why group incentive pay is common in problem
solving teams. Using a simple and well-known career concerns model, we show how
implicit incentives arise when workers in a team generate ideas to solve problems.
Furthermore, when workers generate ideas together in a team, free riding is less of
an issue. So these implicit incentives from problem solving reduce the cost of using
group incentive pay. We also show that when employers have initial bargaining
power and implicit incentives are strong, group incentive pay yields higher profits
than monitoring workers. The interesting feature of this result is that it holds even
when monitoring is costless and thus offers a new perspective to the literature on
monitoring workers in teams (e.g. Alchien and Demsetz (1972)).
Our work on short term teams complements the literature on incentives for long
term teams. Though there is a large business literature on teams that interact for
short periods, there is little theoretical work on how free riding problems can be
overcome in this setting (Edmondson (2012)).
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A central feature in our framework is that competition for ideas in the future
creates incentives for effort today. One particularly interesting extension would be to
look at how returns from ideas decrease in the number of firms that use a particular
idea. Introducing this feature creates a tradeoff: having more firms use ideas in
period 2 creates implicit incentives whereas the value of an idea declines.
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Appendix A
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The first order conditions for problem solver i are given
by
Sfei1(e11, e21, .., eN1) = ei1
When S tends to 1 in the limit, the first order conditions are the same as those
required for efficiency in (4).
Proof of Proposition 2: Notice that we can rewrite S as
S =
N2φ2σ2V + (1− φ)2σ2v
N2φ2σ2V + (1− φ)2σ2v + (1− φ)2(N − 1)σ2v +
N2σ2
λ2
which is strictly increasing in λ. Also because S is strictly increasing in σ2Vi and
σ2Vi is strictly decreasing in σ
2
V , it follows that S is strictly decreasing in σ
2
V . For the
third part of Proposition 2, notice that the partial derivative of S with respect to φ
has the same sign as
(λ2(1− φ)2(N − 1)σ2v +N2σ2 )(2N2λ2φσ2V − 2λ2(1− φ)σ2v)
+(N2λ2φ2σ2V + λ
2(1− φ)σ2v)(2λ2(1− φ)σ2v)
This can be rewritten as
2N2λ4φ(1− φ)(N − 1)σ2vσ2V + 2N4λ2φσ2Vσ2 − 2N2λ2(1− φ)σ2vσ2 (A1)
The expression in (A1) is equal to 0 if and only if
φ(λ2(N − 1)σ2vσ2V +
N2σ2σ
2
V
(1− φ) ) = σ
2
vσ
2

Thus the sign of the derivative of S with respect to φ is non-negative if and only
if
1
φσ2V
≤ λ
2(N − 1)
σ2
+
N2
(1− φ)σ2v
(A2)
Similarly the sign of the derivative of S is strictly positive (negative) if
Notice that the left hand side of (A2) is strictly decreasing in φ and tends to
infinity as φ tends to 0. The right hand side on the other hand is strictly increasing in
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φ for φ < 1 and tends to infinity as φ approaches 1. Thus there is a unique
−
φ ∈ (0, 1)
for which (A2) holds with equality. Furthermore when φ >
−
φ, the inequality in (A2)
is strict and thus S is strictly increasing in in φ. And when φ >
−
φ, the inequality in
(A2) does not hold and S is strictly decreasing in φ.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider an problem solver i. Firms choose βijt for all j =
1, 2, 3, ...N to maximize W i2(y1), subject to incentive compatibility conditions given
by
eij2 = β
i
j2 for all j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (A3)
and subject to the budget balance condition∑
j
βij2 ≤ 1 (A4)
After substituting the incentive compatibility condition into W i2(y1), the first
order necessary conditions with respect to βij2 for all j = 1, 2, 3...N give us
1− βij2 = µ for all j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (A5)
where µ is the non-negative multiplier associated with the budget balance con-
straint. Notice that the budget balance constraint must bind at the optimum.If
the constraint does not bind, then from the complementary slackness condition it
follows that µ = 0. Since
∑
j β
i
j2 ≤ 1, (13) cannot be satisfied for all j = 1, 2, ...N ,
leading to a contradiction. Thus from (13), we have
βij2 =
1
N
for all j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (A6)
and
eij2 =
1
N
for all j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (A7)
Thus a firm that hires problem solver i in period 2, can generate a surplus of
2N − 1
2N
+ E(Vi|y1)
Competition also ensures that all of this surplus, goes to problem solver i. Thus
αii2 =
2N − 1
2N
+ (1− βii2)(Sz + (1− S)
−
Vi) +
1
2
e2i2 − βii2
∑
j
eij2 (A8)
Using (A6) and (A7), we can rewrite (A8) as
24
αii2 =
2N − 1
2N
+
1
2N2
− 1
N
+ (1− 1
N
)(Sz + (1− S)
−
Vi)
Finally, the transfer αij2 is set so that workers j 6= i earn a reservation utility of
0. Thus
αij2 =
1
2N2
− βij2(
∑
j
eij2 + Sz + (1− S)
−
Vi) (A9)
Using (A6) and (A7), we can rewrite (A9) as
αij2 =
1
2N2
− 1
N
− 1
N
(Sz + (1− S)
−
Vi)
.
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider an problem solver i. Firms choose eij2 = 1 for all
j = 1, 2, 3, ...N to maximize W i2(y1). The firs order conditions are given by
eij2 = 1 for all j = 1, 2, 3, ..., N (A10)
Thus a firm that hires problem solver i in period 2, can generate a surplus of
N
2
+ E(Vi|y1)
Competition also ensures that all of this surplus, goes to problem solver i. Thus,
using (A10) we have
wimi2 =
1
2
+
N
2
+ Sz + (1− S)E(Vi)
Finally the following condition must be satisfied so that workers who are not
problem solvers participate. Using (A10) again, we have wimj2 =
1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 3: The expected surplus in either period is strictly concave
in effort with a unique maximum when each worker exerts one unit of effort. Thus
since eij2 < ei1 < 1, the expected surplus in the first period is strictly larger than
the expected surplus in the first period. Also, because ei1 is strictly increasing in S,
and because the expected surplus function is strictly increasing in ei1 when ei1 < 1,
it follows that Lg1 is strictly increasing in S.
Proof of Proposition 4: Notice that effort in the monitoring case is strictly above
1 and is strictly increasing in S. Because the expected surplus function in either
period is strictly concave in effort with a unique maximum when effort equals 1, it
follows that Lm is strictly decreasing in S. Similarly, it can be shown that Lg is
strictly increasing in S. Now take limits as S tends to 0. It follows that
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lim
S→0
Lg = (N + 1)(
N
2
− 2N − 1
2N
) > 0 = lim
S→0
Lg
Thus when S tends to 0 in the limit, we have Lg − Lm > 0. On the other hand
taking limits as S tends to 1, we have
lim
S→1
Lg = N(
N
2
− 2N − 1
2N
) (A11)
and
lim
S→1
Lm =
N
2
−N2(1− N
2
) (A12)
The expression in (A11) is strictly less than the expression in (A12) if and only
if
1
N
< 3(1−N) +N2 (A13)
Notice that for N = 2, the inequality in (A13) holds. Furthermore because the
left hand side is strictly decreasing in N and the right hand side is strictly increasing
in N when N ≥ 2 it follows that the inequality in (A13) always holds for N ≥ 2.
Thus when S tends to 1 in the limit, we have Lg − Lm < 0.
Because Lg−Lm is continuous and strictly decreasing in S, it follows that there
is a unique Sg for which Lg − Lm = 0. 
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